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Abstract
We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game
framed as a situation of employee-employer negotiation over salaries.
Parallel to this, we elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. In the existing liter-
ature, it has often been conjectured that gender differences in strategic
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environments are partly due to differences in risky decision making.
Our evidence suggests that both gender and risk-related effects co-exist
in ultimatum bargaining. However, differences in risk attitudes cannot
explain gender effects in ultimatum bargaining.
Keywords: Gender differences, ultimatum game, risk attitudes
JEL classification: C90, D03, D81
1 Introduction
There is a vast literature reporting gender differences in risky and strategic
settings1. While no consensus exists regarding gender effects in strategic and
competitive contexts2, rather systematically, women are found to be more risk
averse than men.3 As a consequence, several studies tend to conjecture that
1Eckel and Grossman (2008a, 2008b) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) offer reviews of
differences in the economic decisions of men and women in several experimental scenarios.
2For example, in a Prisoner’s Dilemma context, Rapoport and Chammanh (1965), Kahn
et al. (1971) and Mack et al. (1971) find that men are more cooperative than women, while
Aranoff and Tedeschi (1968), Meux (1973) and Ortmann and Tichy (1999) find the opposite
result. Alternatively, Sell and Wilson (1991), Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), Sell et al.
(1993), Nowell and Tinkler (1994), Seguino et al. (1996), Sell (1997), Cadsby and Maynes
(1998), among others, find that gender is not a determinant factor of economic behavior in
the context of public good games. A similar lack of consensus is found in the context of
Dictator Games. Whereas Bolton and Katok (1995) and Frey and Bohnet (1995) find no
gender differences, Eckel and Grossman (1996, 1998) and Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)
report significant gender differences.
3Byrnes et al. (1999) study the relation between gender and risk from a psychological
perspective, whereas an interesting way of attributing this finding to feminine behavior
independently of biological sex is reported in Meier-Pesti (2008). Eckel and Grossman
(2008b) review the results from experimental measures of risk aversion. Croson and Gneezy
(2009) identify robust gender differences in risk preferences. Powell and Ansic (1997) show
that their female subjects are less risk seeking in laboratory tasks than men. However,
other experimental studies identify less straightforward patterns in such gender effects. For
example, Schubert et al. (1999) find that women are, on average, more risk averse in abstract
gambling tasks in the gain domain, less risk averse in the loss domain, and not consistently
different from men in context-rich tasks in either domain. They conclude that gender specific
risk behavior in previous survey data may be due to differences in males’ and females’
opportunity sets rather than stereotypical risk attitudes. Finally, Fellner and Maciejovsky
(2007) study the relation of individual risk attitude, gender, and market behavior. They
find that risk attitude is related to behavior in experimental asset markets and that women
engage less in market activity than men.
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gender differences in strategic settings are precisely due to gender differences
in risk attitudes. Strangely, this conjecture has not been explicitly tested so
far. We undertake this task in the framework of an experimental Ultimatum
Game (UG)4, which is run parallel to a risk elicitation task5. First, we confirm
that females are more risk averse than males. Second, we identify gender
differences in the UG. Specifically, we find that women make lower offers and
reject more than men. However, when jointly accounting for gender and risk
aversion, we reject the hypothesis that gender effects in the UG are due to
gender differences in risk attitudes.
As far as gender differences in bargaining are concerned, Eckel and Gross-
man (2001) report results on gender effects in the context of a repeated UG.
They find that women’s proposals are, on average, more generous than men’s,
regardless of the sex of the partner, and female respondents are more likely
to accept an offer of a certain amount. Furthermore, a given offer is more
likely to be accepted if it comes from a woman, a result which is interpreted
as chivalry. Women paired with women almost never fail to reach an agree-
ment, a fact that is interpreted by the authors as solidarity. Saad and Gill
(2001) conduct a one-shot UG in which subjects face randomly a subject of
the same or other gender. Each subject knows the sex of his/her partner.
They find that males make more generous offers when pitted against a female.
Furthermore, females make equal offers independently of the other’s sex. In
the context of an one-shot UG game conducted by Solnick (2001), it is found
that both sexes make lower offers to women and that both sexes report higher
minimum accepted offers when they face female proposers. Finally, the highest
rejection rate is observed in the case in which a female proposer faces a female
responder. Sutter et al. (2009), report results from a bargaining experiment of
the principal-agent type. They conclude that gender per se has no significant
4A modified version of the seminal experiment by Gu¨th et al. (1982) introduced in
Garc´ıa-Gallego et al. (2008).
5The lottery panel test introduced by Sabater-Grande and Georgantz´ıs (2002).
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effect on behavior, whereas gender pairing has a strong influence. Much more
competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency, is observed when the
bargaining partners are of the same gender. Close to this result, Gneezy et al.
(2003) find a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments and this
effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single-
sex competitive environments. The authors argue that women may be less
effective than men in competitive environments, which is interpreted as the
result of women’s more risk averse behavior. In a different context, Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007) find that risk aversion plays an insignificant role in the
gender gap observed in tournament entry.
Intuitively, heterogeneous risk attitudes should affect behavior in bargain-
ing environments. Specifically, in an ultimatum game, more risk averse sub-
jects should be expected to post higher offers in order to incur a lower risk
of rejection. It is less straightforward to see why risk attitudes may affect a
respondent’s acceptance probability. In a repeated random or fixed matching
design, we could speculate that highly risk averse subjects would tend to ac-
cept more frequently a low offer, because a rejection aimed at teaching the
proponent a more egalitarian behavior is like a lottery in which the minimum
payoff is zero today and the prize is a better offer in the future. Therefore,
there may be two co-existing effects of gender on bargaining behavior: a pure
gender effect and a risk-related one. While the pure gender effect has an ex
ante unpredictable impact on proposers’ and responders’ strategies, the risk-
related effects have theoretically predictable patterns. Namely, women who
are usually more risk averse than men should make higher offers and reject
less.
The coexistence of pure and risk-related gender differences in bargaining
behavior has not been explicitly addressed in the literature so far. Interestingly,
both Eckel and Grossman (2008a) and Croson and Buchan (1999) find that
men and women behave less differently in environments not involving risk.
Thus, in terms of the hypothesis tested here, gender differences in risk attitudes
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should not be a cause of the gender differences in those studies. This seems in
line with our main finding. Namely, that gender differences in an UG are not
due to gender differences in risk attitudes. However, our design and results
help us to go one step further than this conjecture. Our strategy involves
two steps: First, identifying gender effects in risk attitudes. Second, testing
whether these effects explain the gender differences observed in the UG. Our
results reject this hypothesis, as women, who are indeed more risk averse than
men, post lower offers and reject more than men in the UG.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
discuss the design of the experiment on which our analysis is based. We discuss
the main results in section 3. Section 4 concludes. Section 5 is an appendix
that includes all the tables, the instructions to experimental subjects and one
example of the control question.
2 Experimental design
Each experimental session consists of two sub-sessions. Subjects receive their
rewards at the end of the second sub-session as explained below.
In the first sub-session, we elicit subjects’ risk preferences using the lottery
panel test introduced by Sabater-Grande and Georgantz´ıs (2002). The test
is designed in the following way. Let a lottery (q,X) imply a probability q
of earning X (else nothing). Consider a continuum of a such lotteries con-
structed to compensate riskier options with an increase in the expected payoff.
Formally, each continuum of lotteries will be defined by the pair (c, r) corre-
sponding respectively, to the certain payoff c above which the expected payoff
is increased by r times the probability of earning nothing. Therefore,
(1) qX(q) = c + (1− q) · r ⇒ X(q) = c + (1− q) · r
q
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In order to simplify the decision problem faced by our subjects, we use the
lottery panels presented in table 1, which have been constructed using c = 1
and r = 0.1, 1, 5, 10 for panels 1 to 4 respectively. Subjects are asked to choose
their preferred lottery from each panel, knowing that, at the end of the session,
one of the panels will be randomly chosen to determine monetary payoffs and
a number between 1 and 10 will be drawn to determine whether the favorable
outcome emerges for the lottery chosen by each subject in this specific panel.
The more a subject chooses lotteries with higher winning probabilities,
the more risk averse he or she is. Risk neutral and risk loving subjects will
choose the riskier option available to them.6 Furthermore, under standard
assumptions, expected utility maximizers would choose weakly riskier options
as we move from panel 1 to panel 4.7
[Table 1 about here]
As discussed elsewhere8, the test can be used as a reliable source of informa-
tion on risk attitudes as an explanatory variable of behavior in other decision
making contexts. Furthermore, it offers a multidimensional characterization
of risk attitudes. These and other implications of the test for risk elicitation
are discussed in detail by Garc´ıa-Gallego et al. (2010).
In the second sub-session, the UG experiment is run. Subjects are faced
with one of the three experimental conditions described below. In all of them,
6For example, a subject with utility U(X) = X1/t who is offered a panel of all possible
lotteries designed under the linear risk-premium scheme described in (1) would maximize
his expected utility by choosing the lottery (q0, X(q0)), where q0 = (1− 1t ) · (1 + cr ).
The second order condition for a maximum is satisfied, as implied in
(1−t)·(c+r)2·( c+(1−q)·rq )1/t
q·(c+(1−q)·r)·t2 < 0, as long as t > 1. This reflects the fact that risk-neutral
(t = 1) and risk-loving (t < 1) subjects would choose the riskiest option available to them
because their expected utility is by design strictly decreasing in q.
7Using the optimal interior choice q0 = (1 − 1t ) · (1 + cr ), we get ∂q0/∂r < 0, which
implies choosing lower q’s for higher r’s, as long as one’s t is not too high for any risk to be
preferred to the certain outcome c (given the obvious restriction q0 ≤ 1), in which case a
subject might choose q = 1 in panels involving different risk premia. In fact, the necessary
condition for any risk to be preferred to the certain payoff is that r > c · (t− 1).
8See, for example, Sabater-Grande and Georgantz´ıs (2002) and Georgantz´ıs and Navarro-
Mart´ınez (2010).
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the game is framed as a situation in which the proposer is an employer and
the respondent is an employee. The former makes a salary offer X between
0e and 10e (in steps of 0.1) to the latter in order to perform a simple
task9. The latter accepts or rejects, knowing that accepting entails, apart
from a gain of Xe, the obligation to perform the task. Then, the employer
receives a profit of Y = 10 − X. Rejection of a given offer implies no task
performing obligations for the employee and zero gains for both. This context
was introduced by Garc´ıa-Gallego et al. (2008) to address a usual critique
concerning the lack of realism of the standard UG, given that there are few, if
any, real world situations in which people bargain over ‘manna from heaven’.
That paper shows that when the task to be performed by employees is real,
employers post higher offers and employees are more likely to reject a given
offer. This indicates that employees take into account the effort involved in
performing the task and that this is anticipated by employers’ offers. For
comparability with the real task treatment the aforementioned labor market
framing is maintained also in the two treatments in which the task is not really
performed by the subjects. In that case, we talk about a fictitious task. Both
the real (R) and the fictitious (F) task treatments are run with randomly (R)
formed pairs among strangers belonging to one of the matching groups10 of
each session, yielding treatments RR and FR. The matching protocol is varied
in the treatment FF, in which the task is fictitious and employee-employer
matching remains fixed throughout the session. Subjects do not know the
gender of the player with whom they are matched. Each session lasts between
30 and 35 periods.11
9Filling 20 numbered envelops with their corresponding numbered single-page letters
addressed to the responders of a large European questionnaire.
10In order to avoid undesirable session effects, subjects in each session are divided into
two separate matching groups. Differences across groups within the same treatment are not
statistically significant and data reported here are the result of aggregation within treat-
ments.
11In period 30, a random number is drawn among the integers between 30 and 35 to
determine the last period.
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During the session, we also elicit subjects’ beliefs on the outcome of the
game. Specifically, we elicit their valuations of the game in two different ways:
a hypothetical one (Hyp.Valuation) at the beginning of the session, run once
just after the instructions are read, and an incentive-compatible (I.C. Valua-
tion) one, implemented with real monetary consequences 5 times -on periods
7, 13, 19, 23 and 29- before the regular UG is played in this specific period. In
both the hypothetical and the incentive compatible format, subjects respond
to the same payment-card type of control question12, designed to elicit their
certainty equivalent of the game. The five periods (7, 13, 19, 23 and 29) of the
incentive compatible evaluation of the game are chosen to be at similar time
intervals but not identical ones, so that they cannot be predicted by the sub-
jects. The design requires subjects of both types to specify the sure amount
above which they are willing to give up this period’s earnings from the game.
Then, they play the game as in any other period. A random procedure deter-
mines the actual value of the sure payoff, and subjects’ actual gains from this
period, taking into account each subject’s decision for this specific value of the
sure payoff.
The main characteristics of each treatment are included in table 2.
[Table 2 about here]
At the end of the session, two different procedures, one for each sub-session,
were used to determine subjects’ monetary rewards. Regarding the risk elici-
tation task, one of the panels was randomly chosen and a number between 1
and 10 was drawn to determine whether the favorable outcome would emerge
for the lottery chosen by each subject in this specific panel. Regarding the
UG, 5 periods were randomly chosen to determine each subject’s earnings and
employee-subjects’ real task obligations. Monetary payments were made effec-
tive privately at the end of this procedure and after real tasks were performed
12See an example in the appendix.
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by employee-subjects. In the few cases in which a rejection had occurred in all
of the 5 payment periods chosen, the corresponding subjects were paid their
show up fees (3e each) immediately after the end of the UG session. Average
per subject earnings were slightly below 5e for the risky decision making task
and 20e for the UG session.
All experimental sessions were conducted at the Laboratorio de Economı´a
Experimental (LEE) in Castello´n, Spain. A total of 60 subjects (10 employers
and 10 employees per session) participated in this experiment. Subjects were
university students in economics-related degrees and they were assigned once
to a single session. Specific software was written using Fischbacher’s (2007)
z-Tree toolbox.
3 Results
Risk attitudes and belief elicitation
Table 3 presents averages of risk attitude measurements distinguishing be-
tween males and females. On average, females are more risk averse than males
(Mann Whitney test, p=0.032). In table 4 we report results from an OLS
regression model, in which the dependent variable is the average of each sub-
ject’s choices in the lottery panel test. We confirm that females make less risky
decisions than males. Thus, our result seems to agree with a large part of the
literature on this matter.
[Table 3 about here]
[Table 4 about here]
Result 1: Females are more risk averse than males.
As stated already, from Result 1, one would expect that if risk attitudes
were responsible for gender differences in UG, females should make higher
offers. However, we will see that this is not the case. Specifically, exactly the
opposite happens in the real task treatment.
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Table 3 shows that subjects’ hypothetical valuations of the game are very
similar across genders (Mann Whitney test, p=0.662) . However, the incentive
compatible valuations obtained during the game exhibit some gender differ-
ences. Specifically, male proponents hold more optimistic expectations than
females concerning their earnings in the game (Mann Whitney test, p=0.073),
although this difference vanishes among employee subjects (p=0.358). This is
also captured by an econometric model whose results are reported in table 5.
Apart from the gender effect, which is significant at 5%, the estimates reveal
that, employers value the game more than employees do. This is an expected
result, because employers earn approximately 1e more from each successful
transaction. Also, treatment dummies are not significant, which means that
subjects’ valuations do not depend on the matching protocol and on whether
the task is real or fictitious.
With respect to the main focus of the paper, we reach the following con-
clusion:
Result 2: Females’ valuations of the game are lower than males’.
[Table 5 about here]
[Table 6 about here]
Ultimatum game
Generally speaking, behavior in the UG exhibits significant gender effects,
especially in the real task treatment, in which female employers make lower
offers than males, and female employees reject more than male ones.
To see this, we refer first to table 7. We can see that, while in the fictitious
task treatments (RF and FF) male and female subjects make similar offers, in
the real task treatment (RR), male employers offer on average over 0.7e more
than female ones (4.534e vs. 3.801e). Therefore, the existence of a real
task makes male and female employers to behave differently from each other.
The table also shows that the percentage of rejections by female employees
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is higher than those by male employees in all treatments, although the most
striking difference is observed again in the real task treatment (39.773% vs.
4.545% of all the offers received). However, rejection rates are not meaningful
unless rejected offers are taken into account. We formally study employers’
and employees’ behavior in the UG by estimating two econometric models.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 8 reports estimation results from a random-effects GLS regression
whose dependent variable is offer, while independent variables are interaction
terms between gender, risk and incentive-compatible valuations on one hand
and, on the other hand, the three treatments. The estimates indicate a gen-
der effect only in the real task treatment, in which risk aversion and incentive
compatible valuations are also found to be significant. This implies that the
gender effect appears only when the task is real and does not interact with the
matching protocol. The risk aversion effect on offers goes into the expected
direction, namely, more risk averse subjects make higher offers in order to
reduce the risk of a rejection. Valuations have also the expected effect. Sub-
jects who value the game more make lower offers given that employers’ earning
expectations are inversely related to employees’ earnings (salaries).
From the aforementioned findings, and having in mind Results 1 and 2,
according to which women are more risk averse and reveal lower valuations,
we can answer to the question whether gender differences in the UG are due to
gender differences in risk attitudes and/or beliefs. And the answer is negative.
To understand this, remember that according to the model and our initial intu-
ition risk averse employers post higher offers and those with a higher valuation
of the game offer lower salaries. Thus, if female employers’ lower salaries were
due to their risk attitudes and beliefs, they should be higher, not lower, as is
the case here. This is summarized in the following result:
Result 3: There are gender differences in proponents’ behavior which
are not compatible with an explanation based on gender differences in risky
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decision making.
[Table 8 about here]
We move now to employees’ behavior as captured by a random effects
probit model whose dependent variable is the rejection probability of a given
salary offer. Table 9 reports the estimated marginal effects of this model. We
find that males are significantly less likely to reject a given salary offer. Re-
garding the remaining explanatory variables, we observe that, as expected, the
rejection probability decreases as the salary offered to the employee increases.
Employees’ risk aversion and incentive compatible valuations of the game have
no effect on the probability of rejecting a given salary offer. Finally, being
matched with the same employer throughout the session has a significantly
positive impact on the likelihood of a rejection, because the latter becomes
a more effective punishment device under repeated employee-employer inter-
action within fixed subject pairs. Therefore, it is more straightforward to
establish that gender differences in employees’ behavior are not due to gen-
der differences in risk attitudes, because, while the former have a significant
impact on rejections, risk attitudes have no impact at all.
[Table 9 about here]
Result 4: Gender differences in employees’ behavior are not explained by
risk aversion.
4 Conclusions
Given that gender differences in risky decision making have been confirmed
in many studies so far, some researchers tend to assume, without any explicit
control, that gender differences in other contexts are due to differences in risk
attitudes. We have tested and rejected this hypothesis in the context of an
UG framed as a situation of salary negotiation between an employer and an
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employee. Regarding the risk elicitation part of our study, we have confirmed
that females are more risk averse than males. Furthermore, we have found
that, in the ultimatum game, females make lower offers and tend to reject
more than males do. The first result would correspond to a less risk averse
behavior, while females were found to be more risk averse than men. Thus,
gender differences in employers’ behavior are not due to but, rather, despite
heterogeneity in risk attitudes. From the employees’ point of view, we have
found that risk attitudes do not play any role in a subject’s rejection behavior.
Therefore, again, gender differences in employees’ behavior are not due to risk
attitudes, because the latter play no role in an employee-subject’s behavior.
An alternative hypothesis concerning possible belief-related explanations of
gender differences in bargaining environments has also been rejected. In fact,
like in our finding regarding risk aversion, differences across male and female
employers’ offers are also despite gender differences in subjects’ beliefs. Also,
gender differences in employees’ rejection probabilities cannot be explained by
differences in beliefs, because the latter were found not to play a significant
role in employees’ behavior.
Given that our findings reject the hypothesis that gender effects in bar-
gaining environments are due to gender differences in risk attitudes and/or
beliefs, it would be reasonable to look for alternative explanations. It has
been often observed that experimental subjects bring into the lab their values
and experiences from the real world. For example, consider the labor market
framing of our paper.13 In most countries, women are recovering from a long
history of discrimination in the labor market. From this perspective, we can
explain why, in our experiments, their game valuations have revealed more
pessimism regarding their expectations from the game, while at the same time
they have exhibited a tougher bargaining behavior. Unfortunately, this and
other possible explanations of the pure gender effect identified here cannot be
13We are thankful to a referee for raising this point.
13
tested with our data. Hopefully, our findings will inspire further research on
the underpinnings of gender differences beyond risk aversion.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Tables
Table 1: The four panels of lotteries
Panel 1
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X e 1.00 1.12 1.27 1.47 1.73 2.10 2.65 3.56 5.40 10.90
Choice
Panel 2
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X e 1.00 1.20 1.50 1.90 2.30 3.00 4.00 5.70 9.00 19.00
Choice
Panel 3
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X e 1.00 1.66 2.50 3.57 5.00 7.00 10.00 15.00 25.00 55.00
Choice
Panel 4
q 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
X e 1.00 2.20 3.80 5.70 8.30 12.00 17.50 26.70 45.00 100
Choice
Table 2: Main features of the experimental design
Treatment N Male Female Markets Matching Task
RF 20 11 9 10 Random Fictitious
RR 20 6 14 10 Random Real
FF 20 10 10 10 Fixed Fictitious
Total 60 27 33 30
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics (by gender) of risk aversion and hypothetical
valuations elicited before the UG session
Male Female
Hyp.Val. Risk Av. Hyp.Val. Risk Av.
N 27 27 33 33
Median 4.500 0.400 4.500 0.500
Mean 4.815 0.413 4.591 0.528
Std. Dev. 1.338 0.190 1.290 0.189
Mann-Whitney test:
Risk aversion (Male-Female) p=0.032
Hyp. Valuation (Male-Female) p=0.662
Table 4: Risky choice model
Risky Choice Coefficient Std.Err.
cons 0.528 0.033∗∗∗
Male -0.115 0.049∗∗∗
Number of observations 60 R2 = 0.086
∗∗∗ indicates significance at a 1% level.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of real-incentive (I.C.) valuation by treatment
and gender
Male Female
I.C.er I.C.ee I.C.er I.C.ee
RF
N 20 35 30 15
Median 6 4.500 5.500 4
Mean 5.875 4.729 5.467 3.467
Std. Dev. 0.486 0.808 0.843 0.808
RR
N 20 10 30 40
Median 5.500 4 5 4.500
Mean 5.325 4.150 5.317 4.375
Std. Dev. 0.263 0.212 0.757 0.891
FF
N 15 35 35 15
Median 6 5 5 5
Mean 5.700 4.971 4.800 5.067
Std. Dev. 0.520 0.492 0.693 0.503
Overall
N 55 80 95 70
Median 5.500 4.500 5 4.500
Mean 5.627 4.763 5.174 4.339
Std. Dev. 0.456 0.657 0.779 0.930
Mann-Whitney test:
I.C.employer (Male-Female) p=0.073
I.C.employee (Male-Female) p=0.358
Table 6: Real-incentive (incentive compatible: I.C.) valuation model
I.C. valuation Coefficient Std.Err.
cons 3.366 0.399∗∗∗
Type (1: employer) 0.818 0.175∗∗∗
Male 0.375 0.179∗∗
Hyp. valuation 0.211 0.062∗∗∗
FF 0.090 0.231
RR -0.045 0.231
Number of obs. 300 Wald χ2 = 36.050
Number of groups 60 Prob > χ2 = 0.000
Obs. per group: min 5
Std. Err. adjusted for 60 clusters in subjects. ∗∗ indicates significance at a 5% level and ∗∗∗
at a 1% level.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics of offers, accepted offers and % of rejections by
treatment and gender
Male Female
Offer Acc.O. Reject. Offer Acc.O. Reject.
RF
N 132 197 34 198 78 21
Median 4 4 4 4
Mean 3.950 3.998 14.719% 3.970 4.017 21.212%
Std. Dev. 0.015 0.040 0.036 0.024
RR
N 132 63 3 198 159 105
Median 4.500 4.500 4.050 4.800
Mean 4.534 4.457 4.545% 3.801 4.593 39.773%
Std. Dev. 0.338 0.005 1.472 0.195
FF
N 99 163 68 231 68 31
Median 4.100 4.400 4.400 4.400
Mean 4.358 4.509 29.437% 4.501 4.474 31.313%
Std. Dev. 0.405 0.490 0.456 0.400
Table 8: Model of offers
Offers Coefficient Std.Err.
cons 4.436 0.344∗∗∗
Male*FF -0.224 0.248
Male*RF -0.132 0.156
Male*RR 0.921 0.516∗
Risk Av.*FF -0.131 0.431
Risk Av.*RF -0.589 0.511
Risk Av.*RR 1.348 0.624∗∗
I.C. valuation*FF 0.048 0.030
I.C. valuation*RF -0.023 0.029
I.C. valuation*RR -0.232 0.089∗∗∗
Number of obs. 810 Wald χ2 = 64.350
Number of groups 30 Prob > χ2 = 0.000
Obs. per group: min 27
Std. Err. adjusted for 30 clusters in subjects. ∗ indicates significance at a 10% level, ∗∗
indicates significance at a 5% level and ∗∗∗ at a 1% level.
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Table 9: Rejection probability model
Prob. of Rejctn. dy/dx Std.Err.
Offer -0.220 0.041∗∗∗
Male -0.234 0.099∗∗
Risk Av. -0.314 0.274
I.C. valuation 0.023 0.017
FF 0.248 0.117∗∗
RR 0.059 0.115
Number of obs. 810 Wald χ2 = 64.220
Number of groups 30 Prob > χ2 = 0.000
Obs. per group: min 27
Marginal effects after Random-effects probit regression. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at a 1%
level and ∗∗ indicates significance at a 5% level.
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5.2 Instructions to Experimental Subjects for the Ulti-
matum Game (translated from Spanish)
You are going to participate in an experiment about individual decision mak-
ing, that will last approximately 90 minutes. You must follow the instructions
carefully and, depending on your performance, you may earn a considerable
amount of money. The context in which you will have to take your decisions,
is described below.
This session will consist of two main parts:
• First part: 30-35 rounds of a salary-and-task-negotiation session.
• Second part: Result session: task-performing and payment.
• First Part:
An equal number of employers and employees are in a group of 20 indi-
viduals. At the beginning of the session, you will be randomly assigned
the role of employer or employee. In each period [treatment FF: “at
the beginning of the session”], you will be randomly matched with
a player of the other type (if you are an employer, you will be matched
with an employee and vice versa). The experiment will be repeated over
30 to 35 periods (randomly determined by the server).
In each period, each employer-employee pair is faced with the following
situation: The employer offers the employee a share from a 10-Euro profit
yielded from the task (filling 20 envelopes numbered, from 1 to 20, with
their respective one-page letter, also numbered from 1 to 20) which will
be performed (in the second part of the session) by the employee (not
applicable in RF, FF). If the employee accepts, the task will have to
be performed by the employee (see ”Second Part”) and the two players’
earnings are determined as proposed by the employer. Otherwise, the
task is not performed and both players earn nothing.
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If you are an employer, your decision will consist of offering a salary to
the employee. Such a salary will be a quantity between 0 and 10 Euros,
in multiples of 0.10 Euros. If you are an employee, your decision will
consist of accepting or rejecting the salary offered by the employer.
• Second part:
Your payment (and the tasks to perform if you are an employee; not
applicable in RF, FF) will be determined according to the outcome of
five periods, which will be randomly chosen among the total number of
periods played during this session. A minimum of 90% (at least 18 out of
20 envelopes must contain the correct sheet) reliability will be required
for each task unit to be considered successfully performed.
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5.3 Control question: Hypothetical Valuation
Imagine you are assigned the role of an “employee” in the following hypothetical
market situation:
An equal number of employers and employees are in a group of 20 individuals,
forming random employee-employer pairs. You are going to negotiate your share
over a total of 10 Euros earned by one of the employers from the task you will per-
form (filling 20 envelopes numbered, from 1 to 20, with their respective one-page
letter, also numbered from 1 to 20). If you accept the salary, you will perform the
task and earnings for both, you and your employer, will be determined as proposed
by the employer. If you reject the salary, the task is not performed and you both
earn nothing.
Alternatively to your earnings and task-performing obligations, you may prefer a
certain payoff, whose value is provided below, under 20 different scenarios. Please
mark with an ”X” your preferred option in each one of the following scenarios:
• SCENARIO 1: You are offered an alternative of a certain payment of
0.5 Euros.
Do you prefer the certain payoff? ................................................. 
Or your earnings from the above hypothetical market situation?.. 
• SCENARIO 2: You are offered an alternative of a certain payment of
1 Euro.
Do you prefer the certain payoff? ................................................. 
Or your earnings from the above hypothetical market situation?.. 
• SCENARIO 3: You are offered an alternative of a certain payment of
1.5 Euros.
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Do you prefer the certain payoff? ................................................. 
Or your earnings from the above hypothetical market situation?.. 
• SCENARIO 4: You are offered an alternative of a certain payment of
2 Euros.
Do you prefer the certain payoff? ................................................. 
Or your earnings from the above hypothetical market situation?.. 
. . .
. . .
• SCENARIO 20: You are offered an alternative of a certain payment
of 10 Euros.
Do you prefer the certain payoff? ................................................. 
Or your earnings from the above hypothetical market situation?.. 
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